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Abstract—Malicious activities on the Web are increasingly
threatening users in the Internet. Home networks are one of
the prime targets of the attackers to host malwares, commonly
exploited as a stepping stone to further launch a variety of
attacks. Due to diversification, existing security solutions often
fail to detect malicious activities which remain hidden and pose
threats to users security and privacy. Characterizing behavioral
patterns of known malwares can help to improve the classification
accuracy of known threats. More important, since different
malwares can share some commonalities, study the behavior of
known malwares can enable the detection of previously unknown
malicious activities. We pose the research question if it is possible
to characterize such behavioral patterns analyzing the traffic
from known infected clients. In this paper, we present our quest to
discover such characterizations. Results show that commonalities
arise but their identification may require some ingenuity. Also,
more malicious activities can be found out from this analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious activities on the Internet are on the rise. Cyber
attackers constantly devise new schemes to evade existing
security solutions that typically rely on honeyclients [5],
content analysis [4] and blacklisting [8]. As a result, some
of these malicious activities remain unnoticed for long period
of time, jeopardizing the security and privacy of users behind
the compromised end points. Residential networks are even
more susceptible to such risks as they are not as protected as
enterprise networks. Furthermore, the infected machines can
be used by attackers for running malicious campains against
other victims.
We aim to characterize the malicious activities in residen-
tial networks. Clients in the residential networks are usually
equipped with traditional anti-virus tools that are heavily
signature or reputation based. They do not have the macro-
level view of the traffic and hence could not detect malicious
campaign [2]. We have observed that normally some of the
malicious attacks are very stealthy and generate very low
traffic. But, often infected clients generate traffic that has some
commonalities often visible only when looked at the bird’s eye
view of the traffic in the network. We look into the details of
some attacks and try to characterize them. We show that some
of the threats have patterns that are easy to detect as they repeat
the same traffic over time. But, for others the “pattern” lies in
the depth of the traffic.
Existing work characterizes the activities of malware by
executing it in an isolated environment and analyzing the
traffic it generates. However, sophisticated malware identifies
such isolated environment and acts differently [3]. We, on the
other hand, characterize the malicious activities from the real
traffic. Using network traces collected at a residential network
of a large ISP, we explore whether it is possible to identify
some meaningful behavioral pattern of suspicious network
traffic. We start with the alerts generated by a commercial IDS
to detect the malicious events and the corresponding threat
label. We then systematically analyze the traffic of clients
infected with the same threat looking for common behaviors.
If on the one hand the IDS provides hints of where to start the
analysis, on the other hand we find ample “hidden” malicious
activities that went undetected.
We present our journey to explore the different levels of
commonality present in the various threat families. Our contri-
butions are as follow: (i) we present a large scale measurement
study of the malware threatening users residential networks,
(ii) we identify hidden yet malicious network communications
that IDS fails to detect, and (iii) we characterize behavioral
patterns of different threat families.
II. DATASET OVERVIEW
We consider a vantage point located in a commercial ISP
where approximately 20,000 customers are connected. Most of
them are residential households, connected via ADSL modems
to the monitored point. Each customer’s ADSL modem is
given a static IP address, which can be used to identify all
traffic generated/destined to all terminals used in the house-
hold. Since NAT is common, we cannot identify each single
device that is connected at each household. In the following,
we use the term “user” to generally refer to traffic exchanged
by a single household (IP address).
We focus on a trace that we obtained during one day in
April 2012. We use a commercial monitoring tool to process
the packets in real time and extract a text log file in which
each TCP and UDP flow is logged. For each flow, a record is
stored detailing the classic network tuple (source/destination
IP addresses, source destination ports and protocol type), the
timestamp of the first packet, the total number of packets and
bytes sent and received, and the application protocol used (e.g.,
HTTP, SMTP, BitTorrent, etc.). When the application protocol
is HTTP, the record further reports the server hostname, ob-
ject path, user-agent, content-type, response status (e.g., 200
OK), and content-length. In case multiple HTTP transactions
are present in the same TCP flow due to HTTP-persistent
TABLE I
DATASET SUMMARY.
All Traffic Flagged Traffic
Class Users (%) Records (%) Users Records
HTTP 16,217 (79.1) 39.7 M (11.8) 1,308 42,007
Email 3,640 (17.7) 880.7 k (0.2) - -
Chat 3,045 (14.8) 100.8 k (0.03) 7 1,467
P2P 3,163 (15.4) 17.1 M (5.05) - -
OthTCP 18,806 (91.8) 22.7 M (6.7) 24 76
DNS 15,164 (74.1) 30.7 M (9.3) - -
VoIP 8,371 (40.8) 80.5 k (0.02) - -
OthUDP 17,664 (86.2) 224.6 M (66.8) - -
Total 20,486 336.1 M 1,321 43,550
P2P = (eMule, BitTorrent), Email = (SMTP, POP3, IMAP),
Chat = (XMPP, YahooMsg, MSN, IRC)
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Fig. 1. CDF of the total number of per-user records.
adoption, multiple records are logged, one for each HTTP
transaction. Similarly, for each DNS transaction, the tool
logs the requested hostname, the set of IP addresses returned
by the resolver, or the response code in case of an error
(e.g., not-existent domain). To protect users privacy, sensitive
information has been removed and clients IP addresses have
been anonymized.
In parallel to the monitoring tool, a commercial IDS pro-
cesses the packets in real time, producing alerts if a network
activity matches any rule that is present in its database. For
each alert, the IDS specifies the flow network tuple it relates
to and a threat-ID, i.e., a numerical code that identifies a
particular threat. However, the IDS is very conservative in
triggering alerts (possibly) offering a limited view of the
network activity related to a malware. Combining the two logs,
we obtain the dataset described in Table I. In the following
we refer to a flag as a log record for which the IDS triggered
an alert.
Wide-spreading of Malicious Activities. Overall, 20,486
users generated about 336 million total flows over the whole
day. About 20% of those is related to HTTP and DNS records.
Surprisingly, a large subset of users (6.4%) exhibit some ma-
licious activity (i.e., at least one record is flagged), with more
than 150 different threat-IDs being reported. Yet, only 43,550
flags are raised by the IDS. That translates to a negligible
0.013% of all traffic. Most of these records correspond to
HTTP traffic, with the exception of some IRC and RPC flows.
This confirms the very stealthy and low rate activity that
malware is typically generating. In the following we dig into
more details to observe if it is possible to pinpoint differences
between infected users (flagged users in the following) and
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Fig. 2. CDF of the number of flagged records for each user.
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users that are not (not-flagged users).
Traffic Volume of Flagged Users. We first investigate the
occurrences at which flagged events happen. The intuition is
that the more flagged events occur, the easier should be to
spot them in the traffic aggregate. Fig.1 shows the CDF of
the amount of total records logged for all user, and for the
subset of flagged and not-flagged users (i.e., a random subset
of 1,300 users among the not-flagged ones). Results show that
the flagged users generate much more traffic than the rest of
the population. One would think this is due to the extra traffic
generated by the malicious application running at the infected
client. However, flagged users present a very small number of
flags. This is detailed in Fig. 2 that reports the number of flags
per flagged user. We find that 75% (92%) of the users show
less than 3 (10) flags in the whole day, and only two users show
more than 1,000 flags. As such, while malicious activities can
inflate traffic volume, in general the rate of malicious records
is very limited. This is a design choice common to many IDS
products that prefer to limit the number of reported alarms
rather than overloading the analyst with too many events.
Unfortunately, this limits also the visibility on the incidents
that we observe.
III. MACROSCOPIC VIEW OF THE THREATS
To investigate the threats diversity and the traffic they
generate, Fig 3 reports different statistics on the alarms raised
by the IDS.
Consider first the shaded histogram. It shows the number of
users affected by each threat. Threats are sorted by popularity.
Overall, the IDS finds 151 distinct threat activities. Their
popularity is highly skewed, with the most popular threat
affecting about 800 (61%) flagged users. However, 129 threats
are flagged with less than 10 users each. Despite the limited
number of alerts, this highlights a very diversified scenario of
malicious activities.
Next, consider the red dashed line of Fig. 3. It reports the
CDF of the number of flagged records contributed by each
threat. As expected, the majority of these records are related
to the most popular threats. However, the distribution has
several steps, indicating that some threats are more “chatty”
than others and, even when only few users are involved, they
still generate many flagged records. For instance, only two
users are infected by Conficker [6]; yet they contributes to
23.3% of all flagged records. Note that Conficker is a worm
that was first detected in 2008 but is still one of the most
popular threats [7].
The solid line in Fig.3 shows the CDF of the number
of distinct users involved in each threat. In other words,
we progressively add the fraction of new users that were
not listed among the flagged-users of previously considered
threats. Notice how the distribution presents several “plateaus”,
indicating that no new flagged users has been added, i.e., all
involved users were already accounted by previous threats. We
find that 23% of users are flagged with multiple threats. This
is due to users being infected by different malwares, and IDS
using different threat-IDs to differentiate events for the same
class/family/stage of the malware.
Focusing on Popular Threats. We have shown that the
number of flagged records per threat varies vastly, due to
the number of victims and the frequencies with which the
malicious applications generates traffic. We now focus on the
subset of threats that exhibit several flagged records, with the
goal of characterizing their behavior and finding patterns.
Table II details information on the 15 most popular threats.
For some threat-IDs, the IDS provides limited information
on the malicious activity and hence we adopt generic names.
Notice also how some threats presents a type. This corresponds
to the ability of the IDS to identify different variant of the
network traffic of the same threat. The table reports the number
of users affected by each threat-ID, and the associated number
of flagged records. Not surprisingly, drive-by downloads and
Exploit Kits (EKs) are among the most popular threats. More
interesting is the DynDNS activity class that corresponds to
HTTP requests having hostname registered with DynDNS
services that appear to be control messages (e.g., periodic
communications to check network connectivity). Skintrim and
Tidserv are two popular trojans that can trigger the download
of other malwares through backdoors. Toolbar activity threats
are related to the Ask.com toolbar that are triggered by
the download of unwanted advertisement objects or perform
iframe injections in the browser.
Table II further details (i) the statistics of users that have
more than one flag related to the same threat-ID, and (ii) the
average number of flagged records per user. With the exception
of DynDNS, it confirms that most of the users exhibit very few
events. For instance, the most popular threat is found in 781
TABLE II
MOST POPULAR THREATS.
Users ≥ 1 flag Users > 1 flag
# Name Users Flags Users AVG flags
1 Drive-by download [type1] 781 1427 265 (33.9%) 3
2 DynDNS activity [type1] 266 26270 181 (68.0%) 144
3 Blackhole EK [type1] 127 158 20 (15.7%) 2
4 Skintrim [type2] 56 301 46 (82.1%) 6
5 Skintrim [type3] 56 301 46 (82.1%) 6
6 Facebook plugin attack 30 31 1 (3.3%) 2
7 Threat-A 25 27 2 (8.0%) 2
8 Blackhole EK [type2] 25 25 - - -
9 Toolbar activity [type1] 21 105 19 (90.5%) 5
10 Threat-B 21 23 2 (9.5%) 2
11 Threat-C 21 22 1 (4.8) 2
12 Toolbar activity [type2] 17 19 2 (11.8) 2
13 Drive-by download [type2] 15 33 5 (33.3) 4
14 Tidserv 14 228 12 (85.7) 18
15 Threat-D 14 470 7 (50.0) 66
distinct users, but 516 of them were flagged only once during
the whole day. Moreover, 265 users show more than one flag,
but the average is only 3 flags.
Overall, the frequency and popularity of events is very
limited, offering little evidence to investigate some incidents.
In the following, we investigate whether we can highlight
patterns, at least for those incidents that are popular and
repetitive.
IV. SEARCHING FOR PATTERNS IN MALWARES
For threats that have a large number of flagged users
and records, we investigate whether there are “patterns”, i.e.,
recurring events that would allow us to identify suspicious
activities in new threats. We focus on Threat-D and Tidserv
as use-cases. Among all popular threats, these two present the
largest number of flags per-user and a manageable popularity
(about 10 users each). More importantly, they present different
properties that highlight the complexity of the task we try to
achieve.
A. Threat-D
Let us consider Threat-D for which we do not have a priori
knowledge on the malicious activities it relates to. Fig. 4
shows the whole day traffic evolution over time of the user
having the highest number of Threat-D flagged records. Each
point corresponds to a different record whose client IP address
is the same as the selected user. We focus only on HTTP
records. For visualization purpose, we consider an HTTP
event defined as {server IP address, HTTP object name}.
For instance, the records www.acme.com/main/index.html and
www2.acme.com/secondary/index.html that have the same
server IP address (e.g., 10.0.0.1) would be mapped as the same
HTTP event “10.0.0.1/index.html”. Red triangles correspond
to the events flagged as “Threat-D”; blue circles are events
flagged as threats other that “Threat-D”, while gray dots are
“not-flagged” events. The result is a compact representation
of the traffic evolution over time where points on the same y-
values indicate recurrent activity, and vertical shapes indicate
different events happening in short amount of time (e.g., the
user visiting a new web page and fetching all its objects).
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the traffic of the most flagged IP address for Threat-D.
Notice the large periodic activity between 19:30 and 9:00.
During this period, the IDS reports several alerts pinpointing
specific events as better shown in the figure inset. Table III
further details all URIs requested in the first two hours. While
the user was (probably) not active (no vertical clusters of point
are visible), almost all HTTP transactions relate to the same
instal/file.php object hosted on different servers (all hostnames
map to different IP addresses, thus generating different event).
In other words, a sort of “web scan” was happening over
night. Further investigating the user-agent string, we corre-
lated this activity to the Ask.com toolbar. We highlight that
instal/file.php requests represent 78.2% of the overall user’s
requests. This shows that malicious activity can indeed inflate
traffic volume as seen in Fig. 1.
Although the IDS effectively identifies the infected user,
only a small subset of suspicious records are flagged. We
verified that many suspicious HTTP requests failed (with a
response code from the server “404 - Object not found”).
Those are not flagged by the IDS, indicating that the IDS
rules consider both the client request and the server response.
Digging further among the events that are involved in this
incident, we notice a lot of recurrent www.google.com/webhp
requests. Those are legitimate requests, possibly performed by
the malware to run some simple network connectivity check.
Overall, this specific user presents a macroscopic evidence
of temporal malicious patterns considering both a strict def-
inition (i.e., specific sequence of events) and a more general
one (i.e., repetitive behavior leading to a web scan). IDS
provides strong hints of where to start to investigate, but some
ingenuity and domain knowledge is needed to further elaborate
the analysis.
Unfortunately, we cannot generalize this results. In
fact, other 13 users affected by the same Threat-D
do not present the same traffic activity. More in de-
tail, only another flagged-user presents one single instal/-
file.php object request. Flagged records instead point to
ads.staticyonkis.com/www/delivery/afr.php requests happening
in short time (up to 12 per second), with no trace of
the Ask.com toolbar or connectivity check activities toward
Google. In other words, Threat-D exibits to different network
behaviors.
TABLE III
7-9 PM REQUESTED URIS FROM THE MOST FLAGGED USER OF THREAT-D.
URI #
helpindownw.in/instal/file.php 689
notesonacocktailnapkin.com/wp-content/themes/rockstar/instal/file.php 99
www.usedtruckuk.com/wp-content/themes/classic/instal/file.php 93
www.google.com/webhp 73
www.creativelayer.net/modules/mod wdbanners/instal/file.php 50
advantageclubrockford.com/modules/mod wdbanners/instal/file.php 50
dreadneck.com/img/instal/file.php 49†
sotobetawi.com/wp-content/uploads/instal/file.php 46
www.veintisietelunas.com/images/stories/instal/file.php 40
www.usmctennis.fr/wp-content/themes/instal/file.php 40
www.radburnd.com/wp-content/themes/desk-mess-mirrored/instal/file.php 40
theuticashale.com/wp-content/themes/spectrum/instal/file.php 40
jiaotong.info/modules/instal/file.php 40
www.jlabmag.com/modules/mod wdbanners/instal/file.php 25
www.google.com/ 13
sas-rep.ru/space 10†
http://gv.t3.idspeed.com/tramp?ref=yonkis0 5
itjustdawnedonme.com/wp-content/uploads/instal/file.php 5
hannaoverstock.com/modules/mod wdbanners/instal/file.php 5
cuteasabargain.com/wp-content/uploads/instal/file.php 5
bloggasaurus.com/wp-content/instal/file.php 5†
ashishpal.com/wp-content/uploads/instal/file.php 5
www.tpmedia.pl/wp-content/uploads/instal/file.php 4
www.tindellpictures.com/test blog/wp-content/themes/instal/file.php 4
www.theuticashale.com/wp-content/themes/spectrum/instal/file.php 4
www.symzer.com/hey/wp-content/themes/instal/file.php 4
themarcellusshale.com/wp-content/themes/spectrum/instal/file.php 4
thegenieslamp.net/wp-content/themes/headlines/instal/file.php 4
datemit.com/instal/file.php 4
sasrep.ru/space 3†
† = flagged URIs
To further dissect Threat-D behavior, we collected pcap
samples from the vantage point from the client being involved.
Those traces reveal the presence of obfuscated javascript code
being present in the page. We report an example:
/// obfuscated JS code snipped
f =[ ’−32i−32 i 6 4 i 6 1 i−9 . . . i 1 0 i 5 9 i −19i 3 4 ’ ] [ 0 ] . s p l i t ( ’ i ’ ) ; v=” e
”+” va ”+” l ” ;} i f ( v ) e=window [ v ] ; w= f ; s = [ ] ; r = S t r i n g ; f o r
( ; 5 9 3 ! = i ; i +=1){ j = i ; s=s+ r [ ” f ”+” r ”+”omC”+” h a r ”+”C”+” ode ”
] (w[ j ]∗1+41) ;}
[ . . . ]
// de-obfuscated JS
document . w r i t e ( ”<i f r a m e s r c = ’ h t t p : / / gv . t 3 . i d s p e e d . com / t ramp
? r e f = y o n k i s 0 ’ wid th = ’10 ’ h e i g h t = ’10 ’ s t y l e = ’ v i s i b i l i t y :
h i dd en ; p o s i t i o n : a b s o l u t e ; l e f t : 0 ; t o p :0; ’></ i f r ame>” )
var f = document . c r e a t e E l e m e n t ( ’ i f r a m e ’ ) ; f . s e t A t t r i b u t e ( ’
s r c ’ , ’ h t t p : / / gv . t 3 . i d s p e e d . com / t ramp ? r e f = y o n k i s 0 ’ ) ; f .
s t y l e . v i s i b i l i t y = ’ h id de n ’ ; f . s t y l e . p o s i t i o n = ’ a b s o l u t e ’ ;
Notice the f variable carrying a long vector of chars (not
reported entirely for brevity) that corresponds to encoded
instructions with respect to an alphabet of symbols contained
within the script. Once (manually) decoded, the javascript
reveal the iframe injection shown in the bottom of the
listing. Specifically, those instructions are used to trigger
advertisement download (possibly a click fraud activity).
Overall, the lesson learned from analyzing Threat-D is that
neither the passive logs nor the IDS alerts were sufficient to
identify the real common pattern among the users, i.e., the
iframe injection. The IDS groups those users under the same
threat and provides the “seed” of when malicious activity
happens. Non-negligible ingenuity is required to expand those
seeds and spot common patterns.
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the traffic of the most flagged IP address for Tidserv
threat. Patterns are much less evident due to URI and hostname randomization.
B. Tidserv
Consider the Tidserv flagged clients as a second example.
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of traffic of the flagged-user
presenting the highest number of Tidserv flags. A total of 59
flags are found, mostly happening in short time, as visible
by the red triangles. Again, using the sample pcaps and
manual inspection, we find this activity enforcing RapidDNS
search queries that are related to advertisement download (and
possibly click fraud). We report an example:
/ u r l = ” h t t p : / / s e a r c h . r a p i d n s . n e t / main ? I n t e r c e p t S o u r c e =0&
URI= h t t p%3A%2F%2F b a n g l 2 4 n j 1 4 . com%2F [ . . . ] ”
i f ( t o p . l o c a t i o n != l o c a t i o n ) {
var w = window , d = document , e = d . documentElement , b
= d . body ,
x = w. i n n e r W i d t h | | e . c l i e n t W i d t h | | b . c l i e n t W i d t h ,
y = w. i n n e r H e i g h t | | e . c l i e n t H e i g h t | | b .
c l i e n t H e i g h t ;
u r l += ”&w=” + x + ”&h=” + y ;
}
window . l o c a t i o n . r e p l a c e ( u r l )
Note the length of the URIs that are longer
than 150 characters, presenting a clear random-
ization and obfuscation component (e.g., rlyg0-
6nbcv.com/Kvb13nWd6P4XrFs3dmVy [...] PWZhY2Vib29r27c).
Also in this case, the IDS flags only a subset of the records
that exhibit similar patterns, and URIs randomization is
successful in hiding malicious events. Note that simply
checking URI length or syntactic patterns of the random
strings lead to both false negatives and false positives. In
general, even when syntactical rules can be spotted, they
might not capture the nature of the malicious activity.
V. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
We provided a characterization of malware activities in a
real network, starting from a bird’s-eye view to discussing
technicalities of specific threats. Guided by a commercial IDS,
we applied a bottom-up approach using the IDS alerts as
seeds indicating from where to start to look for patterns. By
using pcap files to complement the information provided in the
dataset, we have finally seen coherent and complete patterns
arise. Analyzing such patterns we characterized the behavior
of the threats detected by the IDS. Additionally, this identified
activities that the IDS failed to detect. However, several issues
and challenges remain.
First, using the seeds as a starting point brings the analysis
to immediately face the specificities of a threat. This calls for
a transparent knowledge of the semantics related to IDS alerts
and their role in the overall malicious activities. Commercial
IDS solutions might not always provide this information. Open
source products such as Snort [1] instead solve the issue
by offering public set of rules. However, this comes at the
cost of more cumbersome configurations, i.e., without proper
knowledge about which rules to select and cathegorize, the
system might end up in triggering too false alarms.
Second, despite the strong hints that an IDS provides, those
seeds can result in atomic events not easy to correlate with
other network events. In other words, by being “too close” to
the traffic, we might miss the real general picture related to
the network activity of a threat (e.g., rely on obfuscated JS
to trigger a web scan or click fraud). Similarly, by trying to
extract event sequences or syntactical rules to group HTTP
events, we can only end up in too rigid methodologies. Those
might capture some regularities but lack the generalization and
robustness to malware changes.
Given the complexity reached nowadays by malware, the
manual investigation that we performed in the examples does
not scale anymore. We strongly believe that the research com-
munity has to focus on methodologies to automate the analysis
and augment the understanding of a malicious activities found
in networks, and especially in home networks where terminals
are easily exposed to malware.
How to achieve this is an open research challenge. We
believe that a better knowledge of the network dynamics
of the threat is needed. However, rather than trying to cap-
ture complex threat technicalities within low-level rules, such
knowledge should guide the creation of more high-level mali-
cious symptoms. Those include atomic events (e.g., executable
download) as well as more complex relations among multiple
events (e.g., a DNS scan triggering a click fraud). On the
other hand, each symptom might not be sufficient to identify a
malicious activity. It is indeed through the combination of such
symptoms that we aim to provide a better and more automated
methodology to capture malicious patterns.
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